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“The Heart That Cannot Bear…the Other” 
Reading Mengzi on the Goodness of Human Nature 
Wu Xiaoming 
This paper will discuss the ancient Chinese thinker Mengzi’s 孟子 (ca. 390-ca. 305 
B.C.) thought of human nature. But let us first quote from an increasingly influential 
modern French thinker: Emmanuel Levinas. The purpose of this citation is two-fold: 
on the one hand, it is an attempt to form a potentially constructive dialogue between 
what we will say about Mengzi in this paper and what Levinas has said about man as 
being inescapably responsible for the other; on the other hand, this citation should 
also serve to situate our discussion in wider philosophical contexts. We hope thus we 
may be able, at least in an implicit manner, to bring closer two thoughts or two 
intellectual traditions, viz., Chinese and European, and also to show how Mengzi’s 
thought of human nature, as it is read and interpreted in this paper, can go beyond 
the borders of Chinese thought and language, and take on more universal 
significance. 
Thinking of the subjectivity of the human subject as sensibility, as total 
exposedness to the other, or as bearing, Levinas uses the figure of maternity and 
writes in his later work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 
[Sensibility] is being torn up from oneself, being less than nothing, a rejection 
into the negative, behind nothing; it is maternity, gestation of the other in the 
same. Is not the restlessness of someone persecuted but a modification of 
maternity, the groaning of the wounded entrails by those it will bear or has 
borne? In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point 
of substitution for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution 
and from the persecuting itself in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, 
which is bearing par excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting 
by the persecutor.1 
We now turn to our discussion of Mengzi’s thought of human nature. In the Chinese 
tradition, in which his fundamental position has seemed beyond any doubt, Mengzi 
is the first to maintain that human nature is originally good (xing shan 性善). 
However, it would still require a considerable amount of theoretical courage and 
academic sincerity for one to attempt to sustain such a doctrine on the original 
goodness of human nature in our modern or post-modern times, in which 
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individualistic views of modern theories on human nature have been explicitly or at 
least implicitly accepted, even though the Mencius has long been designated, along 
with the Analects 論語, the Great Learning 大學, and the Doctrine of the Mean 中
庸, as the four fundamental Confucian classics since the Song dynasty, and even 
though it would have been difficult to conceive the intellectual movement of Song-
Ming Neo-Confucianism 宋明理學 as well as that of modern new Confucianism 新
儒家 without Mengzi’s decisive influence.2 Already in his own times, Mengzi had to 
argue with those who did not think that human nature should be regarded as 
originally good. Later on, against Mengzi’s doctrine, Xunzi 荀子 asserts that human 
nature is originally bad (xing e 性惡), because man is born with sensual desires. 
Facing these seemingly profound traditional and modern “insights” into the 
“darkness” of human nature, Mengzi’s insistence on the original goodness of human 
nature seems today a little too simplistic and naïve for one to attempt to defend in an 
philosophically adequate manner. 
Is Mengzi’s doctrine on human nature simply an overoptimistic classical belief in 
humanity that has proven untenable in our times? Or, on the contrary, could it be that 
it is in this classical thought about human nature, with which we may perhaps not 
have been able to come to grips, that the truth of human nature has first shone? And 
in that case we moderns or post-moderns may still be far away from Mengzi’s true 
insight into humanity? Hence we ought to read or re-read Mengzi’s discourse on the 
goodness of human nature. 
Mengzi maintains that human nature is originally good, and that man’s becoming 
bad or evil has nothing to do with this original goodness. But what is the ground that 
Mengzi has provided for this assertion? On what evidence can Mengzi so 
confidently insist on the original goodness of human nature? In order to understand 
his doctrine on human nature, we have to look in Mengzi’s thought for the ground in 
which the goodness of human nature can be truly grounded. Since Mengzi thinks 
that human nature is good in itself, to look for this ground is to look in human nature 
itself for that which would have originally made human nature good. 
The evidence Mengzi provides for the original goodness of human nature is that 
every human being possesses the si xin 四心, or the “four hearts”, which are the 
“heart of ceyin” 惻隱之心, the “heart of xiuwu” 羞惡之心, the “heart of cirang” 辭
讓之心 , and the “heart of shifei” 是非之心 . In D.C. Lau’s popular English 
translation of the book Mencius, these expressions get translated respectively as the 
“heart of compassion”, the “heart of shame”, the “heart of respect”, and the “heart of 
right and wrong”.3 In Mengzi’s view, these four “hearts” are the germs or beginnings 
 
2  The influence of Mengzi’s conception of human nature was decisive for the School of the Mind 
(xinxue 心學) from Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (i.e. Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, 1139-1193) to Wang 
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of the four de 德 or “cardinal virtues”, ren 仁, yi 義, li 禮, and zhi 智, which in Lau 
are rendered respectively as benevolence (仁), dutifulness (義), observance of the 
rites (禮), and wisdom (智).4 Among these de 德 or virtues, ren 仁 has been the most 
fundamental virtue since Confucius. Ren 仁 is the central concept in the Mencius as 
well as in The Analects, in spite of the fact that Mengzi seemed often to juxtapose 
ren 仁 with yi義, dutifulness, or sense for the right. According to Mengzi, the very 
meaning of ren 仁 is “ren 人”, whose literal meaning is simply “man”. By this 
traditional method of interpretation, in which one Chinese character is used to 
interpret and define the meaning of another character of the same pronunciation, 
what Mengzi means is this: ren 仁 as a virtue would determine the being-human or 
humanity of the human (7B16). 5  Therefore, ren 仁  is more than benevolence 
considered simply as a moral virtue. It is rather the essential nature or the essence of 
man. If, according to Mengzi, it is the “heart of ceyin” 惻隱之心 that signifies ren 
仁 (“the heart of ceyin: that is ren” ceyin zhi xin, ren ye 惻隱之心，仁也, 2A6), 
then the “heart of ceyin” is clearly the most important and most fundamental of 
man’s “four hearts”. This is why Mengzi says that without a “heart of ceyin”, a man 
would not yet or would no longer be a human being (wu ceyin zhi xin, fei ren ye 無
惻隱之心，非人也, ibid.). Therefore, if human nature is originally good, this has to 
be for the very reason that every man originally possesses an inborn “heart of ceyin”. 
Since Mengzi grounds the goodness of human nature almost exclusively in the 
“heart of ceyin”, which according to him is necessarily possessed by every human 
being, to understand his thought we must try first to understand this remarkable 
human “heart of ceyin”. What does the “heart of ceyin” signify with respect to the 
essence of human nature? In the Mencius, the expression “the heart of ceyin” first 
occurs in Mengzi’s sustained discussion of the “bu ren ren zhi xin” 不忍人之心, 
which, if we follow the commonly accepted English translation, may be rendered as 
“the heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) others”.6 According to Mengzi, the ideal 
government must be a natural consequence of this “heart that cannot bear (the 
 
modesty”. Others have rendered the Chinese word 心 xin differently in this context. Chan 
translates it as “feeling” (1963, p. 54), Schwartz as “sentiment” (1985, p.267). We would also 
like to remind the reader that many have tended to render心 xin in general as “heart/mind” to 
show that this Chinese word can mean either or both of these two meanings. This 
“undifferentiation” or “indiscrimination” between the two concepts of heart and of mind in 
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4  Since our purpose here is to concentrate on the concept of ren 仁, we will not discuss whether 
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6  Mengzi, 2A6. 
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suffering of) others”, a heart that is necessarily possessed by every man: “Every man 
possesses a heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) others. It is because the Former 
Kings had such a heart that could not bear (the suffering of) others, there was the 
government that could not bear (the suffering of) its people. To govern with this 
heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) others, the ruling of all beneath heaven 
would be as easy as turning a small object on one’s palm.” (ibid) It is in order to 
illustrate this universally possessed human heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) 
others, that Mengzi offers us his famous (albeit perhaps fictitious) example of the 
child who is on the brink of falling into a well. Here Mengzi maintains that on 
suddenly seeing this, any person would “have a heart of chuti ceyin” (jie you chuti 
ceyin zhi xin 皆有怵惕惻隱之心)”. The expression “a heart of chuti ceyin” here is 
more emphatic than “a heart of ceyin”, as chuti 怵惕 has the meaning of being 
alarmed and fearful of. Later on, in his discussion of the original goodness of human 
nature, Mengzi would simply use the expression “the heart of ceyin” to refer to the 
same “heart” mentioned here. For the moment, we will not have to discuss 
thematically the meaning of chuti 怵惕. As for the meaning of ceyin 惻隱, although 
early on we have mentioned its usual English translation as “compassion”, we are 
yet to find what “compassion” or “commiseration” as a human feeling means here 
with respect to the human nature in question. Not assuming that we have already 
understood what such a human “feeling” really signifies in human nature, let us 
temporarily take it for granted, according a certain reading of this text, that Mengzi 
here means that the sight of the endangered child would necessarily arouse 
immediately in anyone some fearful and painful feeling. For Mengzi, then, the “heart 
of chuti ceyin”, or simply the “heart of ceyin” for the convenience of expression in 
Mengzi’s later discussion, is just a typical manifestation in an extreme situation of 
the “heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) others”. Therefore, although later on in 
his discussion of the goodness of human nature Mengzi adheres to the expression 
“the heart of ceyin”, this expression can not be adequately understood without first 
analysing the meaning of the “heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) others”. 
So now let us ask, how should the “heart that cannot bear (the suffering of) 
others” be understood? In order to understand it, we need first to understand the very 
concept of ren 忍. In the Mencius, this concept first occurs in a dialogue between 
King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 (r. 455-405 B.C.) and Mengzi. In this dialogue, when the 
king wishes to know if he himself possesses the virtue for being a true king, Mengzi 
gives him an unambiguously affirmative answer. Mengzi’s ground for this 
affirmation is that he heard from Hu He 胡齕 that the king once ordered to spare the 
life of an ox which was about to be killed for its blood to be used to consecrate a 
new bell. The ostensible reason that he spared the life of the ox is simply that the 
king “could not bear to see it shrinking with fear, like an innocent man going to the 
place of execution”.7 King Xuan of Qi did not understand why he had acted like this 
on seeing the suffering of a mere animal. Hence his question for Mengzi: “What 
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kind of heart (xin 心) is this (that I had at that moment)?” Here xin 心 means what is 
felt and what is going on in one’s “heart” or mind, that is, the state of mind, and can 
accordingly be rendered as feeling or emotion. His question about his own “heart” 
thus means that he wanted to know the inner emotional motivation of his act. 
Mengzi’s explanation for the king is that even if it is merely an animal, a gentleman 
would still be unable to bear to see its suffering.8 And it was out of this “being 
unable to bear” bu ren 不忍, that the king took action to relieve the ox from its 
suffering. In Mengzi’s view, this “being unable to bear” is the very possibility for 
the king’s becoming a true king in caring for and keeping his people under 
protection: being unable to bear to see the suffering of even an animal, one would be 
necessarily even less able to bear to see the suffering of other human beings.  
However, what does this important phenomenon of “being unable to bear” itself 
signify? “Being unable to bear” already presupposes a “being able to bear”. And 
“being able to bear” is a human ability. But this ability is not merely an ability to 
bear something physically heavy, as any act of human bearing, even if it is allegedly 
purely “physical”, requires some mental effort on the part of the bearer, let alone the 
act of any mental bearing. Therefore we have first to analyse the phenomenon of 
“bearing” itself, with which we have been translating the Chinese word ren忍 in 
question so far. However, ren忍 in Chinese means more than simply to bear. Ren忍
implies that one has to make some effort in order to endure what one would not have 
been able to bear in one’s natural capacity. Therefore, ren忍 is to bear more than 
what one can “naturally” bear. Such an act of bearing more than one can bear thus 
requires initiative on the part of the one who is made to bear and has to bear. It is 
because ren忍 or to bear beyond one’s capacity must be the activity of the bearer, 
that we would say in Chinese to someone who has been wounded and undergoing 
enormous pain: “[Try to] endure (ren 忍) it a little. In a moment it will be gone” (ren 
zhe diar, yihuier jiu hao le 忍着點兒，一會兒就好了). Here renzhe diar 忍着點兒 
or “endure it” is a demand which is addressed to the one who is undergoing acute 
pain. Such a demand is only possible because the bearing of one’s wound and pain is 
usually understood as an act of one’s will. However, before such an act of free will 
(this implies reflection, decision, and determination) becomes possible for me, the 
wound and pain that I am determined to bear must have already come upon me. That 
is to say, before I can ever begin to actively endure them, I must have necessarily 
already been passively bearing my wound and pain. But even the expression 
“passively bearing” here seems tautological, as to bear is already passivity itself. 
Having to actively bear my wound and pain already presupposes this passivity, 
passively undergoing one’s wound and pain despite oneself. Therefore, in the “act” 
of bearing one’s wound and pain, the line drawn between activity and passivity has 
already become blurred. And here we are no longer sure if this “act” can still be 
called an act, since an act implies free will and conscious activity. In suffering or in 
pain, which have come upon me despite myself, no matter whether I am resolved 
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and ready to bear my suffering and pain, and whether I am really able to endure 
them, I still have to bear them, and must have already been bearing them, against my 
own free will. This having to and this already come from the very fact that I “have” 
a body, and that the body always already has to “bear” its sensations. If I cannot be 
separated from my body, a body always already “with” its sensations, then as the 
“bearer” of my own body, that is to say, being necessarily corporeal, I am from the 
very beginning a “bearer”, i.e. someone who has always already to bear despite 
themselves. In this sense one can even say that the body is in fact already sensibility 
itself. It is because I have always already started to bear despite myself, that I have 
to bear and must bear, up to the point of giving up this inalienable bearing, which 
would then amount to a total giving up of my own life. One has to and must bear 
because one’s body is already what one has to bear in the first place. From the very 
beginning of one’s life, one already has to bear the hunger, thirst, fatigue, disease, 
wounds, and the ageing of the body. A human being with a body, a corporeal being, 
is bearing itself from the very beginning. Therefore, so-called “actively bearing 
one’s wound and pain” is only a conscious recognition of what I have already been 
undergoing in a “bodily” manner, of what is inescapable for me. In other words, to 
be determined to endure my pain is to be actively passive, which can then only 
mean: to “accept” or “assume” one’s original, or better, pre-original, passivity.9 The 
having-to-bear presupposes this original or pre-original passivity. 
It is because a human being is already itself bearing, that he or she needs to bear 
and can “actively” bear. But active bearing as a conscious act is inseparable from the 
determination of the xin 心 (heart/mind). The so-called bodily wound or physical 
pain can never be purely “bodily” or “physical”. That there have never been such 
pure physical or bodily wounds and pain is because they necessarily dong xin 動心 
or “move (one’s) heart”, as Mengzi put it. Therefore, to be determined to bear one’s 
wound and pain is just to not allow one’s heart to be “moved” by any wound and 
pain that one is suffering from. Since the stirring or movement of the heart generates 
emotion, active bearing in effect amounts to the controlling or even repression of 
emotion. Such controlling or repression aims to cut off the “natural” link between 
sensations, which are normally seen to be bodily or physical, and the heart, which is 
traditionally regarded as emotional. The usual Chinese word to describe this 
controlled or repressed condition is yong 勇, or “courage”. To be able to receive and 
to bear one’s bodily wound and pain in an entirely unmoved manner, and to not let 
one’s heart be “naturally” moved by them, is usually regarded as an embodiment of 
one’s great courage. And courage is traditionally thought to be what enables one to 
deal in a composed or unmoved manner with anything recognised as dangerous, 
difficult, or painful. Hence the desirability of “a heart that cannot be moved” or an 
“unmoved heart” (bu dong xin 不動心) as a great virtue in Mengzi. It is precisely 
because bodily injuries and wounds would necessarily move one’s “heart” (which is 
to say, bodily sensations would “naturally” generate emotion or influence the state of 
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heart/mind), but one can nevertheless increase one’s ability to endure bodily pain or 
suffering through physical training and spiritual cultivation, that Mengzi confirms 
that one can indeed attain the condition of having an “unmoved heart”. And the basic 
method of arriving at this condition is to cultivate one’s personal courage (yang yong 
養勇). The expression, “unmoved heart” (bu dong xin 不動心, which literally means 
“do not move one’s heart” or “not let one’s heart be moved”, and, consequently, 
“(being able to have) an unmoved heart”, however, must already presuppose the 
possibility of the heart being moved. It is because in its natural or uncontrolled 
condition the human heart would always be “moved”, despite itself, by anything that 
touches it through sensation, that sometimes one has to consciously stop it from 
spontaneously doing so. That which can most likely touch my body and move my 
heart is always the other. The other is the one who can harm me in all sorts of ways, 
thus throwing me in pain and suffering. Therefore, not surprisingly, the examples 
that Mengzi gives in his discussion of the unmoved heart are all about those who 
tried very hard to train themselves so as to be able to confront the other fearlessly: 
“The way Beigong You 北宫黝 cultivated his courage was by not shrinking from a 
stabbing into his skin or towards his eyes. For him, to yield the tiniest bit was as 
humiliating as to be cuffed in the market place. He would no more accept an insult 
from a prince with ten thousand chariots than from a common fellow coarsely clad. 
He regarded killing the prince the same as killing the common fellow. He had no 
fear of any feudal lords, and would always return whatever harsh tones came his 
way”.10 Here, Beigong You’s courage was cultivated only in the confrontation with 
or hostility towards another person. The way Meng Shishe 孟施舍 cultivated his 
courage was also by “being able to be without any fear (of the other)”.11 Among the 
examples Mengzi gives here, even Zengzi 曾子, Confucius’ most famous student, 
also talked about Confucius’ conception of great courage in terms of being not afraid 
of the other, despite the fact that in Confucius’ conception of great courage, whether 
or not I am fearful of the other should be determined by whether or not I feel that I 
am righteous. Thus, no matter how different these types of courage are in nature and 
in their degree, it is always the other – the other person’s threat to me – who can 
“move” my heart through threatening to wound my body, and to be able to have an 
unmoved heart therefore always means not to allow my heart to be moved by any 
wound inflicted upon my body by the other. 
A question arises here with regard to this desire for an “unmoved heart”. Why 
should I desire to have an “unmoved heart”? Why should I not let my heart be 
spontaneously “moved” (dong 動) by the other? To desire an entirely “unmoved 
heart” is to desire an ideal self that is completely at home with itself, utterly 
autonomous and self-determining, and never affected by the other. In this desire to 
maintain my self as the self that closes itself in upon itself, or as the subject in 
complete possession of itself, the other is precisely the one that can break my self-
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enclosure and open me up. And the opening up can only be an opening to the other. 
My being open to the other manifests itself precisely in my heart’s being able to be 
spontaneously moved by the other. Therefore, to try not to let my heart be moved by 
the other is to try to close me up to the other or close the other outside myself. Being 
not open to the other, no one will ever be able to affect me and disturb my being at 
home with myself. However, this desire to obtain and maintain an unmoved heart 
against the other shows precisely that, the I, as a being of flesh and blood, have 
always already been exposed, hence open, to the other, and to all the possible insults 
and injuries that may be inflicted upon me. It is precisely because of this “being 
always already exposed to the other”, that I can ever desire to cultivate my courage 
in confronting the other, that is, try to not let my heart be moved by any insult, rage, 
and wounds. However, as the unmoved heart necessarily presupposes the possibility 
of one’s heart’s being able to be moved by the other, courage – the ability to 
fearlessly confront the other – necessarily implies my being already exposed to the 
other, that is, to wounding. This means that the self, the subject, or the subjectivity 
of the subject, is essentially sensibility, and sensibility is essentially vulnerability, as 
Levinas would say. As sensibility, I have always already been offered, in an 
originally completely passive way, to the other without any holding back. Levinas 
says, “In the having been offered [to the other] without any holding back, it is as 
though the sensibility were precisely what all protection and all absence of 
protection already presupposes: vulnerability itself.”12 Similarly, we can say that 
what the need for courage and the cultivation of it signifies is precisely my original 
vulnerability. 
If to actively bear means to be able to have an unmoved heart under any 
circumstances in which one’s heart would have been moved spontaneously, and if 
these circumstances should include both the situations of the heart’s being moved by 
one’s own physical pain as well as by the other (wherefrom comes any possible 
wounding), we can then understand better the meaning of this Chinese expression, 
ren xin 忍心, which literally means “to let one’s heart endure”, “to be able to 
endure”. The act of bearing a physical burden is inseparable from a certain 
determination of the heart/mind. That is to say, to bear can never be merely 
“physical”, like a marble pillar supporting the weight of a roof. To bear is eventually 
to let one’s heart bear. In determinately bearing something, be it physical burden, 
bodily pain or the threat of the other, one must not allow one’s heart to be moved, 
one must make it endure. Therefore, to “have the heart” to (that is, to be able to let 
one’s heart) bear one’s pain is to be able to have an unmoved heart despite the pain, 
and to “have the heart” to bear the pain of the other is to be able to maintain an 
unmoved heart despite the suffering of the other. The former seems to show a 
laudable courage, whereas the latter appears to be “hard-hearted” (hen xin 狠心) or 
“cruel against others” (canren 殘忍, literally, “enduring cruelty”), therefore, ren xin 
忍心, or being able to make one’s heart bear/endure more than it can bear, is an 
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ambiguous quality. Sometimes one has to make one’s heart bear what it may not 
have been able to bear. According to Mengzi, those who were chosen by Heaven to 
bear a great burden all underwent the training of having to make one’s heart to bear: 
“This is why Heaven, when it is about to place a great burden on a man, always first 
tests his resolution, exhausts his frame and makes him suffer starvation and 
hardship, frustrates his efforts so as to move (dong 動) his heart, enable his nature to 
bear better (ren xing 忍性), and make good his deficiencies”.13 Here, to “move his 
heart” (dong xin動心) is precisely to train one’s heart so that it can eventually stay 
unmoved when being touched and stirred, and to “enable his nature to bear better” 
amounts to letting one’s heart bear more than it can bear. 
If all the bearing (ren 忍) is after all necessarily ren xin 忍心: to let one’s heart 
bear more despite itself, that is, to consciously control one’s feeling and emotion, 
then all the not bearing (bu ren 不忍) is necessarily bu ren xin 不忍心, or not letting 
one’s heart bear what it cannot spontaneously bear. However, this “not letting” 
cannot mean: not letting one’s heart bear any burden at all, because the heart has 
always already been bearing, regardless whether one has let it or not. It can therefore 
only mean: let one’s heart be moved by what it can no longer bear. In the case of the 
King Xuan of Qi, what his heart must have already born (as the result of being 
already exposed to an other) but still cannot bear is the suffering of the ox about to 
be killed. It is precisely because he had let his heart be spontaneously moved by the 
suffering of this animal,14 he could no longer “heartlessly” bear to see it go to death. 
So the king’s “being unable to bear” is a certain inability to let his heart bear the 
suffering of an animal. But, curiously enough, this in-ability is simultaneously an 
“ability”: being able to let his heart be moved by what it is unable to bear, that is, by 
the suffering of the other. Out of this “ability” which is at the same time also an 
“inability”, he took action to relieve the other of its pain. In Mengzi’s view, if the 
king could extend this heart to the suffering of his people, and take action to relieve 
them of their suffering, he would of course be able to become a true king in caring 
for his people and in keeping them under protection. Therefore, the possibility of his 
becoming a true king in caring for and keeping his people under protection lies 
precisely in this very “heart” that can be moved by the suffering of others, and that 
will not allow itself to bear it without being moved by it. The “heart that cannot bear 
(the suffering of) other people”, of which Mengzi speaks, is this very heart that 
would be spontaneously moved by the suffering of the other. 
 
13  Mengzi, 6B15. 
14  We are well aware of the seemingly paradoxical nature of the expression of “let one’s heart be 
‘spontaneously (naturally)’ moved”, because if it is truly spontaneously or natural, then there 
cannot be any question of letting it be so moved, and if one has to let it be so moved, then it 
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of the phenomenon of ren 忍 or “bearing”? Something “natural” has to be let be natural in 
order for it to be natural: this is perhaps what is most enigmatic about man’s relationship with 
itself as well as with the other. 
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That my heart would necessarily be moved not only by my own physical pain, 
but also by the suffering of the other is because I, as someone with a body, as 
sensibility, have always already been passively bearing my exposure to the other. 
My body, as sensibility, is itself my being exposed to exteriority, or to the other. But 
this “being exposed to the other” is not only an exposure to any possible wounding 
that may be inflicted on me by the other. It [this “being exposed to the other”] is also 
necessarily an exposure to the suffering of the other, such as in the case of the King 
seeing the ox suffering, or in the case of the one seeing the child in an imminent 
danger. Being exposed to the other, being “touched” through my sensibility, or 
through my self as sensibility, by the pain suffered by the other, I must bear and 
have always already been bearing the other – the other’s pain – in me. For me there 
is no escaping from this necessary bearing. I, as sensibility, have always already 
been the bearing of the other in me. However, although the other – the other’s 
suffering – is what I always already have to bear, it is also what I cannot bear simply 
out of my own “spontaneity”. This is perhaps what the Chinese expression bunot 不 
renbear 忍  renman 人  means. It is precisely because I have always already been 
bearing the other, but by nature I still cannot bear (the suffering of) the other 
spontaneously, as though it is always too heavy a burden for me, that relieving the 
other from its suffering is a necessity for me, and not only my voluntary generosity 
towards the other, a generosity which would come out of my “having already the ten 
thousand things in me”.15 If, on the contrary, I try resolutely to make my heart bear 
the suffering of the other that I cannot spontaneously bear, and not let it be moved by 
this unbearable bearing, I would be doing something against my own human nature. 
This “against my nature” thus can only mean this: against my heart. It is against my 
heart in that my heart is made to bear what is unbearable to it. This against my heart 
would then signify that I have become ren xin 忍心, or in a sense “cruel”. But it is 
precisely because making one’s heart bear what for it is unbearable goes against 
one’s nature or one’s humanity, that becoming ren xin 忍心, or “cruel”, is not 
“natural”, not the “natural condition” in which man would first find himself. To be 
able to make one’s heart bear the unbearable would require “unnatural” 
psychological or mental strength, active effort, and long-time anti-human training 
We seem to be in a better position now to understand the ontological meaning of 
Mengzi’s famous “heart of chuti ceyin”, or “heart of ceyin”. This is the very heart 
that by its nature cannot bear the suffering of the other. But the expression “heart of 
ceyin” itself, in serving to illustrate the heart that cannot bear the suffering of the 
other, says more about this very heart. As ce 惻 and yin 隱 both mean deep and 
profound pain, this expression tells us that this heart that cannot bear the suffering of 
the other would “actually” feel great pain on being touched by the sight of the child 
 
15  Mengzi, 7A4. This “having the ten thousand things in me (wanwu jie bei yu wo 萬物皆被於
我)”, as it is asserted by Mengzi, would seem to be contrary to what we are trying to argue 
here. It requires a detailed separate reading to illustrate its complicated relation with what we 
try to argue “for” Mengzi’s “heart of profound pain (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心)” here. 
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about to fall into the well. One immediately tends to interpret as purely emotional 
this “pain” of the heart that cannot bear the suffering of the other. Being emotional, 
this “pain” should then be understood only as a figure of speech, as one would not 
think that the heart regarded as the seat of emotion can literally feel any pain. 
However, are we here able to distinguish clearly an emotional pain from a physical 
pain? What would it signify if a certain state of heart/mind here seems to have to be 
described by a word allegedly borrowed originally from the sphere of bodily 
sensation? 
To deal with this question, let us return to the situation of the child on the brink 
of falling into a well. In seeing this endangered child, the very “seeing” is itself 
already my being immediately exposed to the suffering of the other. Here my seeing 
is a sense perception. But this sense perception is never purely or merely an intuition 
through sight. The perception of the endangered child immediately seizes upon my 
whole self, thus generating some immediate bodily sensation in me. The Chinese 
word to describe this situation is gan 感: “to feel”, “to affect”, and “to be affected”. I 
“feel” through sight that the child is about to fall into a well. This perception or 
“feeling” affects me, and I am affected. To feel can be a pure sensation, whereas to 
be affected puts me in the state of certain emotion. But, as the Chinese word gan感
has indicated, these two conditions are inseparable. Hence the formation in Chinese 
of the two compounds (words consisting of two Chinese characters) with the word 
gan: ganjue 感覺, to feel, sense perception, feeling, and ganqing 感情, feeling, 
emotion.16  However, in order to be affected, or to have emotion, a body is required. 
Without a body, I would never be able to feel anything inside myself, as I have no 
longer any “inside”. Therefore, without a certain immediate internal bodily feeling 
or sensation generated by sense perception, no emotional pain – the heart of ceyin –
could ever be possible, as this pain can never be separated from a certain bodily 
sensation. It is only because the emotional pain of the heart is not only inseparable 
from bodily pain, but is itself already an immediate bodily feeling, that the Chinese 
word tong 痛, which is an equivalent to the English word “pain”, may be applied to 
describing both so-called bodily condition and so-called mental condition. 
Therefore, the “heart of ceyin”, a heart that can be pained by the other, and that can 
thus feel “emotional” pain, is not just a figure of speech. Of course this pain is not to 
be reduced to “pure” bodily sensation, suppose we really know what such “pure” 
bodily sensation means in the first place, and suppose it has ever been possible for 
human being. 
Thus, in the expression of the “heart of ceyin”, a heart that can be pained by the 
sight of the suffering of the other, it becomes difficult to maintain the line 
traditionally drawn between bodily sensation and emotion. The “heart of ceyin” is a 
heart that can indeed feel pain. The pain felt by the heart is first an internal 
 
16  See, for example, the entry gan 感 in A Chinese-English Dictionary (1980, p. 220, left column), 
where the compound ganjue 感覺  is translated as “sense perception; sensation; feeling”, 
whereas the compound ganqing 感情 is translated as “emotion; feeling; sentiment”. 
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“sensation”. And sensation is always bodily or corporeal. Sensation cannot be 
conceived without the body which can suffer and which has to bear its suffering 
despite itself. It is the body, or the corporeality of the body, that is the condition of 
the possibility of paining and being pained. If man did not have a body, a body that 
is itself already the exposedness to the other, hence a body that can be wounded and 
pained, man would never be able to “feel” anything. If man were purely spiritual, 
that is, only an un-bodily intuition of everything, he could never have had any 
feeling of pain, be it bodily or mental, since a pure intuition without a body – if this 
has ever been possible – would not be affected by what it perceives. In the Chinese 
tradition, especially in Daoism and in some of the thinkers in Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism, there has been indeed such a tendency towards letting man become 
pure un-bodily intuition, or intuition essentially without a body.17 And to let man 
become such pure intuition would amount to a total annihilation of any human 
feeling, which has never been able to become un-bodily or incorporeal. 
And, without any human feeling, there would no longer be any ethical problems. 
Indeed, the author of the Laozi 老子 said: “Heaven and Earth are not humane (ren 
仁), and treat all things as straw dogs; the sage is not humane, and treats all people 
as straw dogs”. The sage is not humane precisely because he has managed to 
eliminate all human feeling from himself; he has trained himself to let his heart bear 
anything without letting it be moved. He has lost his heart or no heart at all. 
However, the problem about this desire for a pure intuition without a body is that 
the becoming pure of intuition relies on the elimination of the body or the 
corporeality of the corporeal body, but it is only on condition of the existence of 
such a body, that any intuition becomes ever conceivable. Since a pure intuition can 
only be achieved by destroying what makes it possible in the first place, it is 
impossible. As the intuition of a human body, no intuition can ever avoid being 
affected by what it intuits or perceives. Man, or man’s body, is itself sensation and 
sensibility. All the human feelings rely on the body as their condition, and all the 
human feelings in turn affect this body. Here all the emotions are grounded in bodily 
sensations, and all the bodily sensations are already feeling or emotion. In the 
sensibility of man, or in man as sensibility, therefore, “bodily” sensation and 
“spiritual” emotion are inseparable. It is precisely because man has a body that can 
feel (gan 感) and can be affected, that s/he can ever have any feeling, which, as a 
 
17  For example, one can read in the Laozi (Chan 1963, pp. 147, 145), “Attain the extreme of the 
void, / Maintain steadfast quietude. / All things come into being, / And I see thereby their 
return.” (chap. 16), and, “The reason that I have great worry is that I have a body. /If I have no 
body, / What worry could I have?” (chap. 13). Cf. Levinas (1981): “At the height of its 
gnoseological adventure everything in sensibility means intuition, theoretical receptivity from a 
distance (which is that of a look). But as soon as it falls back into contact, it reverts from 
grasping to being grasped, like in the ambiguity of a kiss” (p. 75), and, “Maternity, 
vulnerability, responsibility, proximity, contact – sensibility can slip toward touching, 
palpation, openness upon…, consciousness of…, pure knowing taking images from the ‘intact 
being,’ informing itself about the palpable quiddity of things” (ibid., p. 76.). 
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rather “ambiguous” concept, necessarily refers to both sensation (ganjue 感覺) and 
emotion (ganqing 感情), that is, to what can be felt by and in a human body. 
We now can see that Mengzi’s “heart of ceyin”, or the “heart of profound pain”, 
is just such a “feeling” – sensation and emotion – which is necessarily felt in one’s 
being exposed to the suffering of the other. Mengzi maintains that it is as “natural” 
for man to have the heart of profound pain as for him/her to have four limbs. In the 
light of the above analysis, this “natural” analogy now points to a reading of the 
heart of profound pain that may not have explicitly intended by Mengzi, but that has 
nevertheless already been implied in this “natural” comparison. To say that the heart 
of profound pain is as natural as the four limbs is to maintain that the nature of man, 
or the humanity of the human, is essentially defined by its sensibility. Man is 
sensibility, and sensibility is one’s being necessarily exposed to the other. Sensibility 
implies susceptibility and vulnerability. Being exposed to the other, to what the other 
is suffering or may have to suffer, I, essentially as the one with a heart of profound 
pain, or as sensibility, cannot not be affected, or, for better or for worse, be 
“wounded”. Being affected or even “wounded” by the sight and feeling of the 
suffering of the other, I cannot help but feel pain inside myself, in my “heart”. 
Therefore, to be thus pained is not in the first place my voluntary choice out of my 
nobility, as it might have been thought of. It is not I who nobly and generously 
choose to be pained by the suffering of the other, but the other who necessarily 
comes to pain me. Thus in being exposed to the other, I am entirely and originally 
passive. The pain that pains my heart or my whole body in my being exposed to the 
imminent suffering of the child comes before any reflection on my part as a subject. 
It comes upon me despite me. Therefore, I must have already born it before I can 
“assume” it in any way, as the act of assuming entails my conscious determination. 
In assuming the pain that has come upon me, my original passive bearing or 
suffering has already been turned into active bearing, which, as having been said 
above, is also expressed by the Chinese word ren 忍. If for man to have the heart of 
profound pain is as “natural” as for him/her to possess the four limbs, this then can 
only mean that man must necessarily suffer in him/herself for the other in being 
exposed to it. 
Being necessarily pained in being exposed to the other, I have to “bear” the 
other’s pain in my heart or inside my body despite myself. However, “having to 
bear” here means both this original and entirely passive bearing (the suffering) of the 
other, and a certain active bearing (the suffering) of the other. And here lies perhaps 
the entire structural ambiguity of the phenomenon of ren 忍 or to bear. I may be 
prompted by the unbearable pain that I have nevertheless already born, in being 
exposed the other, to take action to relieve it from its suffering, as what the King did 
in seeing the suffering of the ox. However, I may also be determined to actively or 
resolvedly bear the “unbearable” pain and do nothing, hence ignoring the suffering 
of the other. In the latter case, I am actually letting my heart bear more than I can 
naturally bear. And in this “bearing more” against my nature, I am becoming ren xin 
忍心, or “cruel” (to others as well as to myself), and losing my humanity. 
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If there is anything that may have ever “prevented” me from going against my 
nature and becoming “ren xin” or cruel, it is the other to whom I am exposed, the 
other as the child whom, with a necessarily moved and pained heart, I am seeing on 
the brink of the well. The other here comes to oblige me, and I am therefore obliged 
by this other, and responsible for this other. I certainly can still turn away from the 
suffering of the other, as I can let my heart actively bear more than it can bear, and 
not allow it to be moved. But, in order ever to be able to become responsible to and 
for the suffering of the other, I must be able in the first place to be actually touched 
and pained in my heart or inside me by the other. The possibility of the humanity of 
the human, as opposed to the “heartless” inhumanity of Heaven-Earth or the sage of 
the Laozi, lies in this being able to be pained by the other. 
If in Mengzi human nature is asserted to be originally good, then it is this 
original possibility of my being pained inside by the other, this human “heart of 
ceyin”, or profound pain, this sensibility as being exposed to the other, that 
constitutes the original goodness of human nature. Human nature is not originally 
good because of my ability as the subject to voluntarily assume any goodness, but 
because of my “inborn” “heart of ceyin” as my original or pre-original sensibility 
which is vulnerability. As I am the very exposedness to the other, I am therefore 
obliged by the other to do well and to be good. Goodness comes and seizes upon me 
despite myself. However, as man nevertheless both has to bear and can bear what he 
is necessarily exposed to, there is always the possibility of their becoming ren xin 忍
心 or cruel. In Mengzi this is known as losing one’s “original heart” (ben xin 本心
).18 But since one can only lose one’s heart inside oneself, the conscientious effort of 
becoming good can then be nothing other than letting one’s heart – a heart that has 
nevertheless always already suffered the suffering of the other – again be touched 
and pained in one’s being exposed to the other. In being pained, in feeling pain in 
one’s heart, and in feeling the pain of one’s heart, one regains one’s heart of ceyin, 
that is, one’s ren 仁, one’s original goodness or one’s humanity. 
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